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Bringing the Transnational In: Writing Human
Rights into the International History
of the Cold War
SARAH B. SNYDER
One of the most interesting innovations in recent international
history writing is the adoption of transnational approaches. This
article echoes earlier calls for international historians to integrate
transnational methods more fully into their work by highlight-
ing the salience of human rights and influence of human rights
activism as aspects that would otherwise be largely left out of the
history of the Cold War. Such methodological innovation is essential
to a deeper understanding of the Cold War.
This special issue of Diplomacy and Statecraft grew out of a June 2011 con-
ference entitled “New Perspectives on International History.” The day was
a celebration of the career of Professor Kathleen Burk and of the vibrancy
of the field in which she specialises. There have been many fruitful devel-
opments in international history of late, including increasing consideration
of culture, race, and gender.1 One of the most interesting innovations and
one that was highlighted by a number of presentations that day, is the
adoption of transnational approaches.2 I am fortunate to work at an institu-
tion where transnational history is championed. University College London,
where I teach and from which Kathy has recently retired, is home to the
Centre for Transnational History, which facilitates the study and writing
of transnational history. Rather than seeing transnational history as a sep-
arate field of historical inquiry, I view it as an approach or methodology
that enables international historians to study new actors, answer new and
old questions, and broaden their audience considerably.3 Such approaches
have utility even for those who continue to see diplomatic and international
© Sarah B. Snyder.
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Bringing the Transnational In 101
history as most appropriately focused on power and the state.4 With respect
to, for example, détente, international historians adopting a transnational
methodology do not intend to rewrite the history of the period as solely a
time of cultural exchanges and protest movements, but these, and other
elements of the Cold War more readily accessible through transnational
approaches, deserve greater attention.
My contribution to this special issue is an attempt to argue that in order
to answer many critical questions in the history of the Cold War, we need
to use transnational approaches. The drive for greater internationalisation of
Cold War history, which often means moving beyond Anglo–American per-
spectives and sources, has been forcefully championed by Matthew Connelly
and others with positive results. Although it is not yet complete, internation-
alisation is not the only avenue that offers fruitful possibilities for historians
of the Cold War and particularly of its later years—a time of proliferating
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and rising influence for non–state
actors.
Transnational approaches initially developed in an effort to “think
beyond the nation.” One of the earliest uses of the term “trans-national”
came in Randolph Bourne’s “Trans-national America” in the July 1916 issue
of the Atlantic. Bourne urged his readers to reject the melting pot as an
aspiration for American nationalism and suggested a different, more “cos-
mopolitan” conception was preferable. Bourne employed the imagery of
woven fabric as a model for American nationalism, writing, “America is com-
ing to be, not a nationality but a trans-nationality, a weaving back and forth,
with other lands, or many threads of all sizes and colors.” Furthermore, he
highlighted the migration patterns of the early twentieth century, pointing
out that after working for some time an immigrant might go back to their
country of origin and even potentially return to the United States at a future
point.5 Bourne’s imagery of woven fabric might assist our efforts to visualise
how transnational approaches can usefully enhance the history of the Cold
War, which was after all a complicated and multi-layered conflict.
Scholars writing transnational histories rejected the construct of the
nation-state as the only appropriate framework. Instead, they sought to
cast off previous national narratives and illuminate dimensions of historical
reality that cannot be understood from within a purely national perspec-
tive. This impetus took several forms, including world history, international
history, and transnational history, which are terms that people, often mistak-
enly, use interchangeably.6 I would distinguish amongst them by asserting
that international historians look much more at the interaction between
states and have traditionally examined high-level diplomacy and the pro-
jection of power.7 Largely, they still see the nation-state as the basis for their
study. Transnational historians, or those adopting a transnational approach,
often are critical of the nation-state as the unit of analysis and argue they
are writing history that transcends political boundaries. Early definitions of
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102 S. B. Snyder
transnational emphasised nongovernmental status and a focus on more than
two countries. For example, Kjell Skjelsbaek wrote, “For an organisation to
be ‘transnational’ two minimal requirements must be met: At least two dif-
ferent countries must be represented in the organisation and one of the
representatives must not be an agent of a government.”8 These two criteria
have guided transnational history writing in subsequent years, but because
transnational interactions often involve governments as well as nonstate
actors, international and transnational history are increasingly intermingled.
Indeed many topics in international history are impossible to comprehend
without transnational approaches.
Why has this new approach emerged? Some see its increasing promi-
nence as linked with the rise of globalisation.9 Others have argued increasing
attention to transnational history is fueled by regional associations such as the
European Union, which have eroded strict senses of nationalism and created
a new level of organisation for analysis—the transterritory.10 This develop-
ment has been connected with decolonisation, anti-colonial, and postcolonial
scholarship, and what has been termed the “imperial turn,” or attention to
the influence of the experience of imperialism on metropolitan societies.11
It is also linked with moving beyond the nation state or a fixed idea of a
national culture to examine the deep effects of colonialism. Furthermore,
it is connected to a recognition that many communities straddle national
borders or move across them regularly.
The turn toward transnational approaches in international history did
not, as it did in national histories such as United States history, come from an
impetus to transcend the national narrative.12 International historians, almost
by definition, had long seen national histories in a global context. Yet, they
did not always engage with the ideas, nonstate actors, and protests influenc-
ing those states or put another way, with international interactions from the
bottom up.13 Thus transnationalising international history offers new ways of
expanding the field.
As Micol Seigel has written, “Transnational history examines units that
spill over and seep through national borders, units both greater and smaller
than the nation-state.”14 Unless we attempt to see the Cold War transnation-
ally as well, we will miss the people and ideas that are not contained by
national borders. Patricia Clavin reminds us that transnationalism “is first and
foremost about people.”15 Indeed, transnational approaches highlight human
agency in a conflict that too often is written in terms of superpower rivalry.
They also enable us to assess the influence of individuals acting in groups
and organisations that transcend national borders as well as to evaluate
the role of NGOs in inter-state relations.16 Borrowing from Joseph Nye and
Robert Keohane’s classic work on these questions, by studying transnational
interactions we can identify changes in attitudes, new instruments of influ-
ence, and their influence on government policy.17 In the American Historical
Review’s forum on transnational history, Sven Beckert suggested we consider
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Bringing the Transnational In 103
transnational history as a “way of seeing . . . connections across particular
units,” which strikes me as a particularly appropriate way to think about the
approach’s benefits.18 For example, a transnational approach could facilitate
an assessment of the true nature of the iron curtain—how fixed was the
East–West divide and where can we identify moments or points at which it
was permeated.
There are a myriad of ways transnational approaches can enrich
our understanding of international history, including by highlighting the
influence of migration on the conflict. The movement of peoples, and
particularly the diasporas this migration created, shaped the political and
diplomatic alliances that developed. For example, Jason Parker’s work fruit-
fully examines how the transnational black activism of West Indians and
African Americans living in New York City in the 1940s shaped Caribbean
decolonisation.19 His work utilises traditional archival sources such as the
records of the British Colonial Office and United States State Department
whilst also supplementing them with work in the papers of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to reframe
wartime Anglo–American relations in the Western Hemisphere as a story
about the intersection of race and aspirations for freedom. Similar work could
productively examine the intersection of other migrations and diasporas with
Cold War diplomacy.
The transmission of ideas is particularly well suited to exploration with
transnational methods. For the history of the Cold War, they are essential
to understanding how ideas were transmitted and what impact the spread
of these ideas had. Questions of interest include not only how ideas are
received when they travel but also what happens to the ideas themselves—
in what ways do they change due to their journeys? Thus far it has mostly
been political scientists who have been writing about the influence of ideas
on the end of the Cold War.20 Although perhaps it is methodologically more
challenging for historians, we need to do the same. Bradley Simpson’s work
on self-determination and Barbara Key’s work on opposition to torture are
both models in this respect that should encourage others to follow in their
footsteps.21
Transnational approaches are increasingly useful to the history of the
late Cold War. In many ways, it is impossible to understand the 1970s and
later without moving beyond a state-centered approach.22 This is due in
part to the proliferation of NGOs but also forces such as terrorism that
were not confined by national boundaries.23 Furthermore, the history of con-
cern for the environment, a phenomenon that grew in these years, naturally
lends itself to transnational approaches.24 As we are increasingly attentive
to the environmental costs of the Cold War as well as the activism those
inspired, the environmental history of the Cold War is a particularly pro-
ductive area for transnational methods. Similarly, anti-nuclear activism and
influence of the movement on Ronald Reagan’s views on nuclear weapons,
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104 S. B. Snyder
as Lawrence Wittner and Matthew Evangelista’s work have shown, require
different methodologies.25
In some ways, my plea for greater attention to transnational aspects of
the Cold War is in line with Tony Smith’s 2000 call for a pericentric framework
for Cold War history.26 Smith asserted Cold War historians were mired in
the muck of tired analytical frameworks and lamented that even with the
opening of many formerly communist archives, scholarship remained in
the same old ruts. In order to move beyond orthodoxy, revisionism, and
postrevisionism, Smith advanced a “pericentric” approach. By examining the
smaller states in the Cold War, Smith argued we could better understand
how the Cold War spread, intensified, and persisted. Much as pericentrism
shifts our gaze from two superpowers to lower level states such as East
Germany, Egypt, North Korea, and Cuba, a transnational approach simi-
larly moves our attention from the highest levels of international politics
to greater attention to nonstate and lower level actors.27 Thinking about the
Cold War transnationally helps us account for the influence of the Palestinian
Liberation Organisation, Amnesty International, and anti-nuclear scientists—
groups that have been minimised in traditional accounts of the Cold War.28
Just as Smith argued a pericentric framework would give greater agency to
states on the periphery of the Cold War struggle, a transnational approach
similarly broadens the cast of characters and stage upon which the Cold War
is acted.29 Smith asserted that a focus solely on Moscow and Washington
“cannot provide fully satisfying answers” to the critical questions of the Cold
War: why it expanded beyond Europe, the reasons for its episodic intensi-
fication, and why it lasted as long as it did.30 I similarly argue that looking
solely at high-level diplomats and political leaders, who are the subjects of
analysis in traditional international history, cannot provide fully satisfying
answers to some of the most important questions in Cold War history.
Beyond expanding the stage and cast of the Cold War, attention to
transnational actors can encourage re-evaluation of the Cold War’s periodis-
ation. For example, a focus on the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) and transnational human rights activism could suggest
the 1980s, rather than the 1960s or 1970s, as the key “long” decade of the
Cold War. The period 1975 to 1989, or “from Helsinki to Gorbachev” as one
recent volume has put it, becomes a more distinct period than, for instance,
one broken up into détente, the new Cold War, and the conflict’s end.31
Similarly, Akira Iriye argues that examining the Cold War in the context of
international organisations minimises the significance of the “new Cold War”
from 1979–1985 because activism by such organisations remained constant
throughout the longer period.32
Given my own research, I would argue that we cannot understand why
the Cold War ended peacefully with only the more established, traditional
approach. Earlier accounts have highlighted the military arms race, Soviet
economic stagnation, overextension abroad, and other factors in the end of
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Bringing the Transnational In 105
the Cold War. Less attention has been paid to the influence of non-state actors
such as the scientists Matthew Evangelista examines in Unarmed Forces or
the human rights activists that made up the transnational Helsinki network.
Both are key actors in these events whose influence could be overlooked
with a reliance solely on traditional archives.33 As Smith writes, “To study
instead what was going on in Moscow or Washington is simply to miss what
the expansion of the Cold War into Latin America was all about;” just as
studying the Cold War only in situation rooms, National Security Council
meetings, and high-level summits misses important components of the Cold
War.34
Iriye, one of the early evangelists for greater attention to transnational
actors by international historians, argues the development and international
expansion of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and voluntary associ-
ations to be “a theme that is far more critical to our understanding of the
contemporary world than the Cold War.”35 I am not sure that both cannot
exist as essential frameworks for understanding the second half of the twen-
tieth century and beyond. The proliferation of international NGOs in the
first decades of the Cold War were a means of bridging East–West and other
divisions by focusing on issues that transcended military and ideological
rivalry.36 Certainly some NGOs are nationally confined in their member-
ship, activities, and concerns, but many others increasingly had international
memberships, paid attention to developments beyond narrow borders, and
sought to exert influence further afield. In Iriye’s view, these international
NGOs represented a challenge to the zero-sum nature of the Cold War frame-
work, and transnational activism attracted many supporters.37 In these years,
concerns about education, nuclear proliferation, population control, disease,
and economic development garnered considerable interest at the nonstate
level.38 Peace, women’s rights, and human rights also warranted attention
from many international NGOs. Importantly these issues weren’t limited by
political or geographic boundaries, and organisations effectively collaborated
transnationally. As Mark Lytle wrote over ten years ago, “Scholars who ignore
INGOS [international NGOs] or exclusively do state centric-policy analysis are
missing a crucial explanatory mechanism.”39
In addition to gaining insight into the ways in which international NGOs
enriched international society during the Cold War, transnational approaches
also enable us to explore the roles of cultural exchanges, sport competitions,
world’s fairs, and new methods of communication in facilitating personal
connections that transcended Cold War boundaries.40 Protest movements
against nuclear weapons, for self-determination, against violations of human
rights, and in opposition to the war in Vietnam all require transnational
approaches. These movements unquestionably shaped the Cold War world,
especially for those living beyond the upper echelons of Washington and
Moscow.
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106 S. B. Snyder
To offer one example of the different perspective these methods can add
to our understanding of the Cold War, we should consider Jessica Gienow-
Hecht’s entry on the Cold War in the Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational
History, which makes clear the strengths of using transnational approaches as
a supplement to international history. She highlights themes that a reference
work without a transnational approach presumably would have neglected.
For example, migration from the East to the West (first occurring in droves
and then slowing) as well as ideas about modernisation and the transmis-
sion of popular culture garner greater attention than the nuclear arms race
or military alliances.41 These elements could never replace familiarity with
balance of payments crises, Soviet strategic missile capabilities, and shuttle
diplomacy, but they are important components of the picture, particularly
for how the Cold War was lived and experienced at the individual level.
Similarly, thinking about the Cold War transnationally might lead us more
easily to the significance of popular culture in eroding Cold War barriers.
Such approaches have facilitated, for example, Emily Rosenberg’s interesting
work on the influence of consumerism on the end of the Cold War.42
A number of years ago, Michael Hogan encouraged diplomatic histo-
rians to expand their scope. At the time, he and Iriye were amongst the
few proposing inquiry into a broader range of actors, including non-state
actors and NGOs. In his frequently cited Society for Historians of American
Foreign Relations (SHAFR) presidential address, Hogan wrote, “International
migrations, environmental transformations, capital movements, culture and
technology transfers—these and other global phenomena may influence gov-
ernment policies, including the strategic and geopolitical policies that often
preoccupy diplomatic historians. These transnational forces and their human
elements are the stuff of a new international history and should not escape
our attention.”43 Hogan was heralding this new approach in 2004, signaling
to his colleagues the insights that could be garnered through methodolog-
ical innovation. I want to assure the skeptics that adopting transnational
approaches does not erode diplomatic historians’ traditional concerns about
power.44 Indeed, the ways in which it makes the history of ideas more acces-
sible suggests such methods might enable scholars to look more closely at
soft power or other factors shaping international relations.45
Transnational approaches are particularly essential to the aspects of the
Cold War most interesting to me: human rights activism and United States
human rights policy. This is because for much of the Cold War, attention
to human rights was confined to non-state actors and lower level officials,
meaning in those years the issue will only appear sporadically in high-level
records. Therefore, scholars seeking to explore the significance of human
rights activism need to be creative to discern the evolution and influence of
what we might call a human rights lobby. Methodologically, one needs to
examine the archives of human rights organisations and the personal papers
of those active on these issues.46
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Bringing the Transnational In 107
In an incredibly influential recent book, Samuel Moyn has written that
the “drama of human rights . . . is that they emerged in the 1970s seem-
ingly from nowhere.”47 Moyn argues that Carter’s election “opened the way
for the astonishing explosion of ‘human rights’ across the American political
landscape.”48 He sees the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and Carter’s “explosive
affiliation with the language” of human rights in January 1977 as leading
to the issue’s subsequent prominence in international relations.49 Without
these influences, Moyn asserts that “human rights might have remained the
preserve of expanding but still minor advocacy groups and their interna-
tional members and promoters.”50 His book makes a number of important
contributions to the field and is now an essential reference point for all
subsequent work on human rights, but I believe adopting a transnational
approach would have enabled a fuller portrayal of rising interest in human
rights. Given that as of 1975 Amnesty International had nearly 1400 mem-
ber groups in Europe alone and won the Nobel Prize in 1977, labeling it
“minor” strikes me as a mischaracterisation.51 Based on extensive research
in the archives of human rights organisations, individual activists, and influ-
ential allies such as members of Congress, I see concern for human rights
in the United States and internationally growing from grassroots initiatives
often focused on a particular country, issues, or crisis such that by the late
1970s there was an international human rights movement.52 Jean H. Quataert
has a similar view of transnational movements for human rights in the 1970s
that focused on Soviet dissidents, the disappeared in Argentina, and women.
In her view, “Advocacy [became] transnational due to the increased ability
of local activists and organisations to develop horizontal ties to like-minded
people across borders and vertical links to national and international organi-
zations and agencies.”53 The work of Quataert and others demonstrates that
in the 1970s, to use Iriye’s term, a “global project” devoted to human rights
emerged. 54
Other scholars, such as Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, have also
identified greater grassroots impetus for transnational human rights con-
nections. In discussion of the United States as an ally to human rights
activists, they write, “Domestic human rights organizations in repressive
countries learned that they could indirectly pressure their governments to
change practices by providing information on abuses to human rights officers
in American embassies for inclusion in the United States annual coun-
try reports.”55 A transnational approach is necessary to understanding the
agenda, tactics, and influence of these organisations, particularly how they
regarded United States human rights policy and saw themselves as con-
nected to the United States government. According to Keck and Sikkink,
“Many human rights activists considered Patricia Derian, assistant secretary
of state for human rights during the Carter administration, part of the human
rights network in the sense that she shared many of their values, and she
and her staff were in frequent communication with them.”56 Such insights
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 C
oll
eg
e L
on
do
n]
 at
 06
:22
 28
 Ju
ly 
20
14
 
108 S. B. Snyder
can be gained only by research agendas that recognise the agency of human
rights activists and seek to incorporate their perspectives.
For my own work, a transnational approach has been essential to
explaining the evolution of United States president Ronald Reagan’s stance
on the CSCE. Whereas in the 1970s Reagan charged that the CSCE’s con-
cluding agreement—the Helsinki Final Act - had “put the American seal of
approval on the Red Army’s Second World War conquests,” the United States
actively and constructively participated in the Helsinki process during his
presidency.57 How can such a shift be explained? Certainly the Carter admin-
istration, and particularly its ambassador to the CSCE follow-up meeting in
Belgrade, Arthur Goldberg, had demonstrated that the CSCE was an addi-
tional forum in which Cold War propaganda points could be scored. But,
several years after Belgrade during the 1980 campaign, Reagan questioned
whether the United States should participate in the subsequent CSCE review
meeting in Madrid given the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: “Frankly, I have
an uneasy feeling that going to Madrid is negating what we thought we could
accomplish by boycotting the Olympics. If the athletes can’t go, why should
the diplomats go?”58 Furthermore, the new Reagan administration sought to
diminish American attention to human rights more broadly, exemplified by
the nominations of Jeane Kirkpatrick to serve as United States Ambassador
to the United Nations and Ernest W. Lefever to head the State Department’s
Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Both were vocal critics
of Carter’s human rights policy. Human rights activists were key members
in the campaign to defeat Lefever’s nomination; examining records beyond
those generated in the White House and Foggy Bottom is the only way to
appreciate why the nomination floundered and the administration’s overall
approach to human rights subsequently shifted.59 Transnational activism led
to Reagan modifying his position as well as recognition by the president and
his administration that human rights was an effective way to criticise their
ideological rival.
Human rights did not only remain at the grassroots level and was not
confined to the Carter administration. One of the principal arguments in my
book is that Reagan’s attention to human rights in the East–West context
was surprisingly consistent with Carter’s approach and more effective than
his predecessor’s had been.60 The involvement of high-level White House
and State Department officials in advocating for the release of prominent
dissidents demonstrates engagement with the issue. Negotiating with Soviet
leaders over the recent arrests of a Soviet spy in the United States, Gennadiy
Zakharov, and a falsely accused American journalist, Nicholas Daniloff, in
Moscow, American diplomats sought the advice of Helsinki Watch, a promi-
nent NGO focused on human rights in Eastern Europe, as to which dissident
the United States should seek to add to the deal.61 According Aryeh Neier,
one of the leaders of Helsinki Watch at the time, staff members “had heard
[Yuri] Orlov was in bad physical condition out in Siberia and needed help.. . .
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Bringing the Transnational In 109
So, we said Orlov.”62 After the Soviets agreed to make Orlov part of the deal,
they stripped him of his citizenship and released him into exile; Assistant
Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne Ridgway called
Helsinki Watch’s New York office and said, speaking of Helsinki Watch’s
Executive Director Jeri Laber, “Tell Jeri she’s got her man.”63
Orlov’s inclusion in a prisoner exchange orchestrated by the
American and Soviet governments highlights the importance of transnational
approaches to fully understanding the Cold War. A traditional approach might
see Orlov only as a pawn in one of a series of human trades between the
superpowers. A different perspective could offer answers to the questions,
how did Orlov capture State Department attention? Why was Helsinki Watch
consulted on bilateral prisoner exchanges? The answers requires analyzing
Orlov’s place in Soviet dissident movements, his links with activists in the
West, and growing attention to human rights violations in East–West relations.
Orlov initially angered Soviet authorities when he gave an anti-party speech
in the first months of Nikita Khrushchev’s thaw.64 After a long, informal exile
in Armenia, Orlov returned to Moscow in 1972 and connected with other dis-
sidents there. He worked to establish a Soviet Amnesty International Group
and was soon fired from his job as a nuclear physicist for his activism.65
With little left to lose at that point, Orlov became increasingly involved
in what he termed the “democratic human rights movement.”66 Along with
Jewish refusenik Anatoly Shcharansky, Orlov identified a way to reframe the
1975 Helsinki Final Act and use it to advocate for improved human rights
conditions in the Soviet Union.67 Their innovation—to establish a group of
private citizens who would openly work to assist the Soviet government in
ensuring the agreement was fulfilled - inspired a wave of Helsinki monitoring
groups across Eastern Europe and beyond. Through transnational connec-
tions formed before and in the wake of Orlov and Shcharansky’s arrest and
imprisonment, human rights violations became a prominent element of Cold
War diplomacy.68 Without Orlov, the Helsinki Final Act could have had min-
imal long-term influence when in fact it contributed to the peaceful end
of the Cold War. Neglecting actors, such as Orlov, who work outside tra-
ditional organs of power offers us an incomplete picture of the Cold War.
Such stories would be left out without a transnational approach because the
influence of nonstate actors cannot be measured solely through governmen-
tal records but also requires work with sources produced by human rights
activists and organisations. Researching human rights activism in repressive
countries presents additional challenges as creating, distributing, or preserv-
ing reports on Soviet human rights violations were cause for arrest, meaning
that historians are often forced to rely on fragmentary evidence—often the
records that remain are those successfully smuggled out of the country.69
Nonetheless, international history will be worse off if it does not evolve to
take account of these additional stories.
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110 S. B. Snyder
Despite the new paths of historical research opened by transnational
thinking, considerable work remains to integrate such approaches into main-
stream international history. Without methodological innovation, however,
much could be lost. For example, a traditional approach limits our ability to
understand the influence of human rights activists and concern for human
rights on international relations during the Cold War, as evidenced by the
fact that most notable recent histories of the Cold War barely mention
human rights. For example, John Lewis Gaddis’ The Cold War discusses the
issue in connection with only four topics: the Jackson-Vanik Amendment,
Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy, the United Nations, and the Helsinki Final
Act.70 Walter LaFeber’s America, Russia, and the Cold War contains only
one reference to human rights, in connection with Jimmy Carter’s foreign
policy.71 Warren I. Cohen’s America in the Age of Soviet Power looks at
human rights as they related to Carter’s foreign policy, the Soviet Union gen-
erally, and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.72 Melvyn Leffler’s For the Soul of
Mankind included more discussion of human rights, drawing connections to
the issue in the context of discussions of Soviet dissidents, religious freedom,
Carter’s foreign policy, the Helsinki Final Act, China, and the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment.73 Finally, George Herring’s much lengthier account of United
States foreign relations (the text is just short of a thousand pages) examines
human rights in connection with the aforementioned topics as well as the
Iraq War, Latin America (which seems like a serious omission in the other
volumes), social activism, the Trilateral Commission, and United States viola-
tions, amongst others.74 I have written elsewhere that historical surveys are
particularly easy targets as even the most accomplished historians can mud-
dle finer details and nuances when working across a broad span of history.75
Nonetheless, it is important to ask why so many of the most prominent, sin-
gle volume histories of the Cold War ascribe such a limited role for human
rights in the history of the conflict.
Understanding that authors of synthetic histories need to make difficult
choices regarding which actors, issues, and events warrant our attention, we
also need to ask ourselves, what stories are left out of the Cold War if we
ignore human rights? Certainly, the development of a transnational move-
ment against apartheid in South Africa would be neglected.76 In addition,
these accounts largely ignore the role of dissidents and their transnational
supporters in ending the Cold War. Similarly, mothers, journalists, and
lawyers distraught about the repression in the Southern Cone and the ways
in which their activism shaped debates about international assistance, the
purview of the United Nations, and later transitional justice are all elided from
these accounts of the Cold War despite recent works demonstrating their
significance.77 To offer an additional example, the genocide in Cambodia is
largely neglected in the accounts discussed above. Considering the human
rights dimension in this case would give a very different picture of the
normalisation of Sino–American relations.78
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We also need to interrogate the few moments at which human rights
are already seen as part of the Cold War more critically, which in the sur-
veys I examined included the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, Carter’s foreign
policy, and Tiananmen Square. For example, accounts of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment are often written as a battle between Senator Henry F. Jackson
(D-WA) and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, set within a broader
legislative-executive branch rivalry and questions about the morality of
détente.79 A transnational approach would examine how this legislation was
influenced by Jewish activists in the Soviet Union, Israel, United States, and
elsewhere as well as how the amendment and its sponsors were perceived in
those communities. Historians examining this legislation from a transnational
vantage point would also explore how the amendment fit into broader
human rights and religious activism at the time. Similarly, a transnational his-
tory of the crackdown on protests in Tiananmen Square would give greater
attention to the student protesters—their national and international objec-
tives, the ties that connected them, and how cognisant they were of broader
interest in their cause. It would also examine the role of the international
media in capturing attention for the demonstrations and translating of the
students’ demands and aspirations for external observers. In addition, think-
ing transnationally about Tiananmen would necessitate attention to young
people sent into exile or who wished not to return to China in the crack-
down’s wake; transnational connections made with one another, human
rights activists, or political leaders in subsequent years would be significant
to understanding the international legacies of Tiananmen.
During his presidency and immediately thereafter, Carter’s approach to
human rights was criticised from the right as naïve, misguided, and inconsis-
tent. Jeane Kirkpatrick delivered one of the harshest evaluations of his policy
in “Dictators and Double Standards”; she claimed that Carter disproportion-
ately focused on the records of American allies, potentially undermining
American security.80 In the intervening years, particularly as more docu-
ments become available at the Carter presidential library in Atlanta, Carter’s
record on human rights has been repeatedly reassessed. Not surprisingly,
many have found aspects of his attention to human rights praiseworthy.81
Interestingly, there also have been reappraisals of Carter’s policy, from
further to the left, that have it insufficiently robust.82 In diplomatic histo-
rian Kenton Clymer’s view, the Carter administration, particularly National
Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, prioritised normalising relations with
China over condemnation or action in response to the Cambodian genocide.
Although Carter did label Cambodia “the worst violator of human rights
in the world today” in April 1978, the denunciation was slow in coming
and not followed with any American action.83 Like Kirkpatrick, Clymer crit-
icises Carter for episodic attention to human rights: “From time to time
and place to place, the defense of human rights was a significant feature
of Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy. But it was not a primary consideration
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for National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, and, to the extent that
Carter allowed Brzezinski to formulate foreign policy, the defense of human
rights faded as a central administration concern. Nowhere was this more
clearly seen than in Cambodia.”84 To highlight these stories, which I view as
essential to understanding the Cold War, we need transnational approaches.
For example, how was Carter’s emphasis on human rights perceived, not
just in ministries and presidential palaces in foreign capitals, but by human
rights activists themselves or their families who were often drawn into the
cause as well? What do their records and testimonies say about the degree
to which his policy should be judged as consistent or effective? Thinking
transnationally will help international historians of the Cold War uncover
deeper histories of policies and events assumed to be familiar, just as such
approaches reveal relatively unknown individuals, like Yuri Orlov, as key
actors in the Cold War.
Calls for international historians to adopt transnational approaches are
not new; many of the seminal articles pressing this point date to the mid-
2000s. Yet, transnational perspectives, such as those that enable fuller under-
standing of the significance of human rights, have not gained mainstream
acceptance. As more scholars increasingly show how, for example, human
rights activism influenced foreign policy and state-to-state relations—more
traditional concerns of international historians—transnational approaches
will cease to be seen as a “new” perspective on international history.
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